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Abstract
In this paper we present a new proposal for defining ac-
tual causation, i.e., the problem of deciding if one event
caused another. We do so within the popular counter-
factual tradition initiated by Lewis, which is charac-
terised by attributing a fundamental role to counterfac-
tual dependence. Unlike the currently prominent defi-
nitions, our approach proceeds from the ground up: we
start from basic principles, and construct a definition of
causation that satisfies them. We define the concepts of
counterfactual dependence and production, and put for-
ward principles such that dependence is an unnecessary
but sufficient condition for causation, whereas produc-
tion is an insufficient but necessary condition. The re-
sulting definition of causation is a suitable compromise
between dependence and production. Every principle
is introduced by means of a paradigmatic example of
causation. We illustrate some of the benefits of our ap-
proach with two examples that have spelled trouble for
other accounts. We make all of this formally precise us-
ing structural equations, which we extend with a timing
over all events.
1 Introduction
Causal modelling has become ubiquitous in Artificial Intel-
ligence circles, and is gaining popularity in other fields as
well. An unsolved problem in this context is how to define
actual causation, i.e., when should we say that one event
caused another? Although progress has been made over the
last decade, not a single definition on offer goes uncontested.
In this paper we develop a new proposal for defining actual
causation. In comparison to the large number of proposals
out there, our approach offers the important benefit that it
starts from basic principles. Indeed, many existing defini-
tions lack proper foundations. Even when a detailed justi-
fication is given, it mostly consists of informal guidelines
rather than precise formal conditions. By contrast we aim
to make explicit what principles we take to be fundamen-
tal to causation, and show their consequences on particular
examples. In this manner even those who disagree with the
verdicts of our definition are guided to the principles from
which they follow.
As a starting point, we delineate the borders of the search
space we wish to explore. This implies formulating a suf-
ficient and a necessary condition. The former serves as a
lower bound, in the sense that its extension is a subset of all
cases of actual causation, whereas the latter forms an upper
bound. These conditions thus form the boundaries of a spec-
trum of concepts that contains actual causation somewhere
in between. The task before us is to provide principles which
point towards a single concept in this spectrum.
The literature on actual causation abounds in convoluted
examples that discredit or confirm definitions of causation.
To make matters worse, these definitions themselves often
turn out to be quite hard to understand. To avoid these pit-
falls we illustrate every principle by a very simple exam-
ple, and indicate how the intuition behind it can be made
formally precise using structural equations. To obtain max-
imal clarity, all but one of these examples are made up of
the same ingredients, namely two protagonists named Billy
and Suzy, each holding a rock in their hand, and a bottle
that is standing a bit further waiting to be shattered. Hall and
Paul (2003) introduced these types of examples, which are
now widespread in the literature. Small changes to the de-
tails of the scenario suffice to highlight what we take to be
the fundamental issues of the debate. Although we view it
as a benefit of our approach that it can be developed using
the simplest of examples, we also show how it handles two
examples that have spelled trouble for other accounts.
Elsewhere (Beckers and Vennekens, 2016a; Vennekens,
2011), we have discussed a graded, probabilistic notion of
causation, but in the current paper we restrict ourselves to a
binary concept, i.e., we are purely interested in the question
whether or not something is a cause. Further, for the most
part we limit ourselves to deterministic examples. Also,
we set aside interesting recent research regarding the influ-
ence that norms and expectations have on our causal judg-
ments (Halpern and Hitchcock, 2015; Hitchcock and Knobe,
2009). We intend to address these issues in relation to the
definition here developed in future work.
Lastly, we point out that there is one important problem
which (for the most part) we will ignore in the current work:
the (in)transitivity of causation. We discuss this issue in-
depth in (Beckers and Vennekens, 2016b), where we offer
additional support for the definition of causation as devel-
oped here, by considering under what conditions causation
violates transitivity. Therefore the two papers are compli-
mentary.
In the next section we introduce the formal framework
of structural equations. Section 3 presents dependence as a
sufficient condition for causation, followed by a necessary
condition in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 then present pro-
duction as a necessary but insufficient condition lying in be-
tween the previous ones. Section 7 addresses issues arising
from non-determinism, and also compares our approach to
that of Halpern and Pearl (2005). In Section 8 we refine our
conditions by having a more detailed look at dependence,
which narrows down the search space to a single option by
discussing another example in Section 9. Section 10 inter-
prets the resulting definition as a compromise between the
concepts of counterfactual dependence and production. To
conclude, Section 11 discusses two examples which other
definitions are unable to handle.
2 Structural Equations Modelling
We briefly introduce a simple version of structural equa-
tions modelling, which is the most popular formal lan-
guage used to represent causal models. In general, structural
equations allow functional dependencies between continu-
ous variables, or discrete variables with possibly an infinite
domain. However, the actual causation literature typically
considers only examples made up of discrete variables with
a finite domain, and propositional formulas. Further, in the
majority of cases the variables are Boolean. This is why we
restrict attention to those kinds of models. For a detailed in-
troduction, see (Pearl, 2000).
A structural model consists of a set of endogenous vari-
ables ~V , a set of exogenous variables ~U , and a causal model
M . Although we only consider models with Boolean vari-
ables, we should point out that the results we will present
can easily be generalized to allow for multi-valued variables
as well. We explain this below.
The model M is a set of structural equations so that there
is exactly one equation for each variable Vi ∈ ~V . An equa-
tion takes the form Vi := φ, where φ is a propositional for-
mula over ~V ∪ ~U . For any variable Vi, we denote by φVi the
formula in the equation for Vi in M . If an equation takes the
form Vi := Uj = uj for some Uj and uj , we shall say that
Vi is determined directly by ~U . We follow the customary
practice of leaving the equations for such endogenous vari-
ables implicit, and simply state the value Vi takes in each
particular story.
For an assignment (~v, ~u) of values to the variables in
~V ∪~U , we denote by φ(~v,~u) the truth value obtained by filling
in the truth values (~v, ~u) in the formula φ. An assignment
(~v, ~u) respects M , if for each endogenous variable Vi, its
value vi = φ
(~v,~u)
Vi
. As usual, we only consider models M in
which the equations are acyclic, which implies that for each
assignment ~u to ~U , there is exactly one assignment (~v, ~u)
that respects M . Therefore, we refer to ~U = ~u as a context.
For every value ~u of ~U , we call the pair (M,~u) a causal set-
ting. We write (M,~u) |= φ if φ(~v,~u) = true for the unique
assignment (~v, ~u) that respects M .
A literal L is a formula of the form Vi = vi or Ui = ui.
Our restriction to Boolean variables is made concrete here:
the only values vi we consider are true and false. Hence
our definitions and results can be generalised by simply lift-
ing this restriction.
We will use the atom Vi as a shorthand for Vi = true,
and the negated atom ¬Vi as a shorthand for Vi = false.
Regardless of whetherLi ≡ Vi orLi ≡ ¬Vi, we write φLi to
mean φVi . Hence in the case where Li ≡ ¬Vi, ¬φLi will be
a propositional formula that makesLi true in any assignment
that respects M . Further, we denote by L(M,~u) the set of all
literals Li such that (M,~u) |= Li.
A causal model M is a tool to represent counterfactual
relations between variables, in the sense that changing the
values of the variables on the right-side of an equation can
change the value of the variable on the left-side, but not vice
versa. This makes them suitable devices to model interven-
tions on an actual setting, meaning changes to the value of
a variable Vi that affect only the values of variables that de-
pend on Vi, but not those on whom Vi itself depends.
Syntactically, we make use of the do()-operator intro-
duced by Pearl (2000) to represent such an intervention.
For a model M and an endogenous variable Vi, we denote
by Mdo(Vi) and Mdo(¬Vi) the models that are identical to
M except that the equations for Vi are Vi := true and
Vi := false, respectively. Hence for a causal setting (M,~u)
such that (M,~u) |= C, the causal setting (Mdo(¬C), ~u) cor-
responds to the counterfactual setting resulting from the in-
tervention on (M,~u) that prevents C.
To illustrate, we present a very simple causal model de-
scribing a boy named Billy and a girl named Suzy, who
occasionally like to get together and throw rocks at a bot-
tle. We need three endogenous variables: BS represents the
event that the bottle shatters, ST and BT that Suzy, respec-
tively Billy, throw a rock. In this toy example, we assume
that either rock is sufficient for the bottle to shatter. Also,
we do not model the causes of them throwing, and just take
this to be determined by the background conditions. Thus an
appropriate causal model M for this example consists of the
single equation BS := ST ∨BT .
Throughout this paper, we takeC andE to be endogenous
literals, where C is a candidate cause for the effect E.
3 Counterfactual Dependence
Consider the first of our rock-throwing stories:
Example 1. Suzy throws a rock at a bottle, while Billy idly
stands by with a rock in his hand, having no intention to
throw it. Suzy’s rock hits the bottle, at which point it shatters.
Formally, this example is represented by the context such
that only Suzy throws her rock, resulting in the assignment
{ST,¬BT,BS}. Without hesitation everyone would agree
that Suzy throwing her rock caused the bottle to shatter. This
judgement can be justified by a straightforward counterfac-
tual observation: if Suzy had not thrown her rock, then the
bottle would not have shattered. Formally, we use the fol-
lowing definition.
Definition 1 (Dependence). Given a causal setting (M,~u)
such that (M,~u) |= C ∧E, E is counterfactually dependent
on C if (Mdo(¬C), ~u) |= ¬E.
In words, E is counterfactually dependent on C if inter-
vening on the value of C, while holding the context fixed,
results in ¬E. In the example it is easy to see that indeed
BS counterfactually depends on ST, but not on ¬BT .
This simple example, and the way we treat it, accounts
for the majority of our everyday causal attributions. Hence it
should come as no surprise that Hume (1748) defined actual
causation – causation, for short – as counterfactual depen-
dence – dependence, for short.1 Following him, dependence
is taken by many to be an important intuition underlying
causation (Hitchcock, 2001; Hall, 2004, 2007; Halpern and
Pearl, 2005; Halpern, 2016; Lewis, 1973; Pearl, 2000; Wes-
lake, 2015; Woodward, 2003). In fact, all of these authors
agree, as do we, that dependence is sufficient for causation.2
Therefore this assumption serves as our starting point.
Principle 1 (Dependence). If E is dependent on C in a
causal setting (M,~u), then C is a cause of E w.r.t. (M,~u).
4 Contributing Cause
While dependence is sufficient for causation, it is well-
known not to be necessary. Indeed, Symmetric Overdetermi-
nation (SO) and Preemption – both Late (LP) and Early (EP)
– are notorious counterexamples. In this section we compare
Example 1 to SO, postponing LP and EP until later.
Example 2. [Symmetric Overdetermination] Suzy and Billy
both throw a rock at a bottle. Both rocks hit the bottle simul-
taneously, upon which it shatters. Either rock by itself would
have sufficed to shatter the bottle.
In terms of our causal model, this story represents the con-
text in which both Suzy and Billy throw. Intuitively, most
people judge each throw to be a cause of the bottle shatter-
ing. However it is easy to see that it is dependent on neither
(although it is dependent on at least one rock being thrown,
i.e., Mdo(¬BT,¬ST), ~u) |= ¬BS). Despite the lack of depen-
dence, there still is a sense in which we can legitimately say
that each throw contributed to the shattering of the bottle.
To clarify this notion of contributing, let us zoom out for
a second and consider the general causal model, rather than
this specific story. At the general level, i.e., in absence of
any information regarding the context ~U , all we can say
is that both ST and BT could contribute to BS. Formally,
we introduce the concept of a contributing cause to express
this, which is also defined by Weslake (2015) and Woodward
(2003).3 First, we define the following helpful concept.
Definition 2. We define that a consistent set of literals L
is sufficient for a literal Li w.r.t. M if
∧
L ⇒ φLi and Li
is positive, or
∧
L ⇒ ¬φLi and Li is negative. Here,
∧
L
denotes the conjunction of all elements of L.
Recall that M consists of a set of equations of the form
Vi := φVi , where φVi is a propositional formula. Then, ac-
cording to Definition 2, L is sufficient for Li w.r.t. M just
1Surprisingly in the same breath he formulated a different def-
inition as well, known as the regularity account, which is also still
influential.
2Halpern (2016) discusses this for all of the HP-approaches,
and Weslake (2015) does so regarding most of the others.
3Our formulation and the ensuing principle are not entirely
identical to theirs, but the difference is negligible.
in case the conjunction of literals in L logically entails the
propositional formula φVi (when Li ≡ Vi), or the proposi-
tional formula ¬φVi (when Li ≡ ¬Vi).
For example, in our rock-throwing model, {ST} is suf-
ficient for BS because ST ⇒ ST ∨ BT is a logically valid
implication, and {¬ST,¬BT} is sufficient for ¬BS because
¬ST ∧ ¬BT ⇒ ¬(ST ∨BT ) is trivially valid.
Definition 3. Given M , we define that C is a direct possi-
ble contributing cause of E if there exists a set of literals L
containing C, such that L is sufficient for E, but L \ {C} is
not. We call L a witness for C w.r.t. E.
Note that this definition is context-independent, and that
only literals which appear in the equation for E can ever
be direct possible contributing causes. To illustrate, both ST
and BT are direct possible contributing causes of BS, with
witnesses {ST} and {BT} respectively: {ST} and {BT} are
both sufficient for BS, and ∅ is not (since > 6⇒ ST ∨BT ).
More generally, the connection between two literals need
not be direct:
Definition 4. Given M , we define that C is a possible con-
tributing cause ofE if there exist literals C = L1, . . . , Ln =
E so that each Li is a direct possible contributing cause of
Li+1.
Besides the sufficiency of dependence, all authors men-
tioned earlier also agree on the principle that ifC is an actual
cause of E, then C has to be a possible contributing cause
ofE.4 Indeed, if C is not a possible contributing cause of E,
then under no circumstances does it affect the truth of E.
A natural step is to zoom in again, and refine this concept
and its corresponding principle to the level of an actual story,
by plugging a specific context ~u into the model M .
Definition 5. Given (M,~u) |= C ∧ E, we define that C
is a direct actual contributing cause of E if C is a direct
possible contributing cause of E with a witness L such that
(M,~u) |= L.
Using this notion allows us to differentiate between the
role of BT in the contexts of Example 1 and Example 2.
For Example 1, we have that (M,~u) 6|= BT , and hence
there is no witness for BT being a direct actual contribut-
ing cause of BS. For Example 2, on the other hand, we have
that (M,~u) |= BT , and hence {BT} is a witness to the fact
that BT is a direct actual contributing cause of BS. Again
we can generalize this concept by considering a chain of di-
rect contributing causes.
Definition 6. Given (M,~u) |= C ∧ E, we define that C
is an actual contributing cause of E if there exist literals
C = L1, . . . , Ln = E so that each Li is a direct actual
contributing cause of Li+1.
From now on we speak simply of C contributing to E,
rather than saying that C is an actual contributing cause of
E. We now formulate our second principle, which provides
a necessary condition for actual causation and therefore de-
lineates the upper border of our spectrum.
4For details regarding most of the approaches, again see (Wes-
lake, 2015).
Principle 2 (Contributing). IfC is a cause ofE in a causal
setting (M,~u), then C contributes to E w.r.t. (M,~u).
Informally, what this principle states is that all ac-
tual causes of E are literals that contributed to satisfy-
ing/falsifying a formula φVi for some variable Vi, which
in turn contributed to satisfying/falsifying another for-
mula φWi , etc., which in the end contributed to satisfy-
ing/falsifying φE .
The only difference between this principle and the one
mentioned after definition 4, is that we have filled in an ac-
tual context. Weslake’s definition (2015) has this principle
directly built into it, as his (STRAND) condition. The reader
may verify that all the other definitions mentioned above
also satisfy the principle proposed here, as long as one takes
into account the restriction to Boolean endogenous variables
made earlier.
Although this restriction is of no importance for the over-
whelming majority of cases, there is one exception. In mod-
els that represent “trumping causation” by means of a three-
valued variable, some of these definitions do call an event a
cause even though it fails to contribute to the effect. How-
ever, the majority of authors agree that this is the wrong
answer.5 Hence if anything, this speaks in favour of Con-
tributing.
Applying this principle allows us to exclude certain liter-
als that clearly are not causes, such as ¬BT in Example 1.
We thus now distinguish three relations between C and E:
• E is dependent on C. (ST in Example 1)
• C does not contribute to E. (¬BT in Example 1)
• E is not dependent on C, but C does contribute to E. (ST
and BT in Example 2)
By Dependence and Contributing we know that there is
causation in the first, and not in the second, of these cases.
(That the cases are mutually exclusive, and thus the con-
junction of our principles consistent, follows from Theorem
1 in Section 5.) Since ST and BT are causes in Example
2, we might hope that besides being necessary, contribut-
ing is also sufficient for causation. In the following two sec-
tions we present two counterexamples to the sufficiency of
contributing, and develop two principles which explain what
may prevent contributing literals from being causes.
5 Production
The following story is paradigmatic in the literature for what
has come to be known as Late Preemption (LP).
Example 3. [Late Preemption] Suzy and Billy both throw
a rock at a bottle. Suzy’s rock gets there first, shattering the
bottle. However Billy’s throw was also accurate, and would
have shattered the bottle had it not been preempted by Suzy’s
throw.
In this story, the process of Billy throwing a rock and shat-
tering the bottle is preempted by the process involving Suzy,
and this happens after the effect has occurred, i.e., after the
bottle has shattered. This is in contrast to Early Preemption
5See (Weslake, 2015)[p.17] for a discussion.
(EP), in which a process is preempted before the effect oc-
curs.6 (See Section 7.)
As in SO, the bottle shattering is overdetermined by both
throws, and again the bottle’s state is not dependent on either
throw. The difference here is the asymmetry that Suzy’s rock
hits the bottle, while Billy’s does not. Our causal judgments
reflect this asymmetry, as people unanimously judge Suzy’s
throw to be the sole cause.
How should we formally represent this example? If we
continue using the three-variable causal model BS := ST ∨
BT , then we end up with the same causal setting as in SO.
Since BT is a cause in SO, but not in LP, we need to re-
fine our representation to take into account the difference
between them. More specifically, we need to represent pre-
cisely that difference which justifies the shift in causal status
of BT when going from SO to LP.
As noted, the difference between SO and LP is whether
or not Billy’s rock hits the bottle. Hence, one might distin-
guish between the two cases by adding variables SH andBH
to the model, which represent Suzy’s, respectively Billy’s,
rock hitting the bottle. Using such a model allows one to
make the following observation: if we hold fixed BH at its
actual value, then BS is dependent on ST in case of LP, but
not so in case of SO. This approach is taken by Halpern and
Pearl (2005) – HP – whose work on actual causation has
set the benchmark for others to compare with. Their defini-
tion – in its many versions – takes full advantage of holding
fixed variables at specific values regardless of their equa-
tions, given that certain structural criteria are fulfilled. They
refer to these non-standard causal settings as structural con-
tingencies.
We discuss the HP approach in Section 7.1, for now suf-
fice it to say that we believe this approach is flawed, for it
does not take into account the reason why Billy’s rock did
not hit the bottle, despite him throwing it. Yet that reason is
obvious: Billy’s rock arrived at the bottle too late. Or, in the
words of Hall (2004)[p. 8]:
Once the bottle has shattered, however, it cannot do so
again; thus the shattering of the bottle prevents the pro-
cess initiated by Billy’s throw from itself resulting in a
shattering.
If there is any principle regarding causation which is ac-
cepted across the board, then it is the fact that causes come
before – or at most simultaneous with – effects. Our ap-
proach to handle LP consists in combining said principle
with the temporal information regarding Billy’s rock.
In order to formally represent this idea, it is necessary to
represent the completion of each of the competing processes.
The most obvious way to do so is by adding one variable
for each process: SA represents Suzy’s rock arriving at the
bottle’s location, and analogously for BA and Billy’s rock.
Our new causal model consists of the equationsBS := SA∨
BA, SA := ST, and BA := BT .
As with the original model, ST and BT are possible con-
tributing causes of BS. All we have done by adding the in-
termediate variables SA and BA is make explicit that the
6These examples and this manner of distinguishing between
them are due to Lewis (1986).
contributions of both ST and BT to BS are mediated en-
tirely through SA andBA, i.e., a thrown rock can only cause
a bottle to shatter by flying through the bottle’s location with
sufficient momentum. Hence the question as to why BT is
not a cause of BS in LP is shifted to the same question re-
garding BA. The answer follows from a straightforward ap-
plication of the accepted principle that causes come before
effects, since the bottle had already shattered by the time
Billy’s rock arrived.
We will say of prevented processes and the associated lit-
erals, like BT and BA, that they have been preempted for
the effect. Literals that represent a process which completed
succesfully, like ST and SA, will be referred to as producers
of the effect.
Given the essential role of temporal information, we
choose to represent it separately from the variables. In this
manner our approach is not dependent on there being suit-
able variables that capture the consequences of temporal
asymmetry, like the variables SH andBH mentioned above.
This representational clarity proves useful when dealing
with cases of late preemption involving an omission, where
such variables are unavailable and other approaches fail, as
in Example 10 further on.
Definition 7 (Timing). A timing τ for a causal setting
(M,~u) is a function from L(M,~u) to N.
Informally, a timing can be interpreted as follows. An
atom, like BT , represents the fact that some event occurs
in our story. Hence, if Li is an atom, τ(Li) simply repre-
sents the moment at which the event Li happens, e.g., the
moment that Billy throws his rock. If, on the other hand, Li
is a negated atom, like ¬BT , then it represents an omission,
i.e., it represents that some event does not occur. Since there
is little sense in asking when an event does not occur, we
take the pragmatic view that in this case τ(Li) represents
the moment at which the last event occurred that prevents
¬Li from happening, in the sense that the outcome of this
event – together with the outcomes of all previous events –
falsifies the formula φLi .
7 Hence, the timing of omissions is
derived from that of events.
We want to point out that aside from this temporal dif-
ference, we treat negated atoms and atoms symmetrically
throughout this paper, although some authors object to such
a view.8 This issue will pop up further on in the discussion
of Example 5.
Also, by always interpreting atoms as events and negated
atoms as omissions, the temporal asymmetry here intro-
duced can be viewed as an implicit distinction between a
default and a deviant value of a variable: only variables tak-
ing on their deviant value true have an independent tim-
ing, whereas the timing of variables remaining in their de-
fault value false is determined by the timing of the former.
This perspective proves helpful when considering Example
10 further on. (We point out though that our version of the
7Here we are using the informal term “prevent” to get across
the general idea. The precise interpretation of a timing is given in
Definition 10.
8Halpern and Hitchcock (2015) provide some of the different
views regarding this matter.
default/deviant distinction is rather minimal in comparison
to other versions, such as for example that of Hitchcock
(2007).)
If τ(Li) < τ(Lj), then this means that Li happened/was
prevented before Lj in the actual story. If τ(Li) = τ(Lj),
then this means that both happened simultaneously, at least
in the sense that the granularity of the story does not allow
us to say which happened first.
Because not every story provides – or requires – complete
temporal information, we also introduce the following con-
cept.
Definition 8 (Partial timing). A partial timing τ for a causal
setting (M,~u) is a partial function from L(M,~u) to N.
Now that we have extended a story (M,~u) to include
a timing, we can do the same for a counterfactual story
(Mdo(¬C), ~u): before ¬C, everything remains as it was in
the actual story, after ¬C the timing remains open.
Definition 9. Given (M,~u, τ) |= C, we define τdo(¬C) as
the partial timing that is identical to τ up until τ(C) − 1,
has τdo(¬C)(¬C) = τ(C), and is not defined elsewhere.
Because the structural equations represent causal relation-
ships and causes must always precede their effects, the struc-
ture of the equations imposes restrictions on the timings that
are possible. In particular, whenever Vi/¬Vi was caused at
some time t, the causes that enabled/disabled φVi must have
already been present at this time. Further, as mentioned, an
omission is caused at the same time as the last event which
enabled it.
Definition 10. Given (M,~u, τ), for every n, we denote by
Ln(M,~u) the set {Li ∈ L(M,~u) | τ(Li) ≤ n}. For each en-
dogenous variable Vi and the literal Li containing Vi such
that (M,~u) |= Li, we define τ to be valid for Vi if
• Li = Vi and τ(Li) ≥ min
k∈N
{Lk(M,~u) is sufficient for Li};
or
• Li = ¬Vi and τ(Li) = min
k∈N
{Lk(M,~u) is sufficient for Li}.
A timing is valid for (M,~u) if it is valid for all variables.
For example, in our rock-throwing story where both
Billy and Suzy throw, we require that τ(BS) ≥ τ(SA) ∨
τ(BS) ≥ τ(BA). In case Billy does not throw, we require
that τ(¬BA) = τ(¬BT ) = τ(Ui), where Ui represents the
exogenous event which prevents Billy from throwing. We
can generalize the idea of validity to include partial timings.
Definition 11. A partial timing τ is possible w.r.t. (M,~u) if
there exists a timing τ ′ that extends τ (i.e., τ ′(Li) = τ(Li)
whenever τ(Li) is defined) such that τ ′ is valid w.r.t. (M,~u).
Using the timing, we can formalize the notion of produc-
tion.
Definition 12. Given (M,~u, τ) |= C ∧ E with τ a valid
timing for (M,~u), we define C to be a direct producer of E
if C is a direct actual contributing cause of E w.r.t. (M,~u),
with a witness L such that for each Li ∈ L, τ(Li) ≤ τ(E).
More generally we define production in terms of a chain
of direct producers.
Definition 13. Given (M,~u, τ) with τ a valid timing for
(M,~u), we define C to be a producer of E if there exist
literals C = L1, . . . , Ln = E so that each Li is a direct
producer of Li+1. For a partial timing τ ′, we define that C
is a producer of E w.r.t. (M,~u, τ ′) if there exists at least one
valid timing τ that extends τ ′ such that C is a producer of E
w.r.t. (M,~u, τ).
5.1 Comparison to Hall’s Production
Our definition of production is inspired by the concept with
the same name from Hall (2004). His definition, however,
is restricted to positive literals only, i.e., he only considers
chains of direct producers C = L1, . . . , Ln = E in which
all literals Li are positive. Our definition includes all cases
of production covered by Hall’s original version, but also
allows the literals in a chain to be negative. For example,
our definition also applies to cases of so-called Double Pre-
vention, which are typically considered to show how depen-
dence and production diverge. (Examples 4 and 10 further
on are illustrations.)
As will become clear later, our more tolerant notion of
production paves the way to a natural compromise between
dependence and production into a single concept of causa-
tion. It was the failure to find such a compromise that orig-
inally motivated Hall to accept the existence of “Two con-
cepts of causation”, a view which he later abandoned (Hall,
2007).
Hall identified a problem with his definition of produc-
tion, namely that it is context-sensitive. He illustrates this
with the following example (Hall, 2004)[p. 31].
Example 4. First imagine a scenario where we have E :=
C ∧ D, and both C and D are true. Then we zoom in on
the details, and learn that the situation also involves an
intermediate variable B, such that: E := C ∧ ¬B, and
B := C ∧ ¬D.
In both versions, E is dependent on both C and D, so ac-
cording to our definition they are both causes of E, and thus
also producers. According to Hall’s definition of production,
D is a producer of E in the first version only. Yet all the sec-
ond version does is to make explicit some details that before
were left implicit. In terms of the three original variables, the
two models behave identically, namely E holds only if both
of C and D do. In the second version, D prevents B, which
would have preventedE, making it a case of Double Preven-
tion. Because the chain fromD toE contains an omission, it
cannot fall under Hall’s definition of production. From this
he concludes that production must be context-sensitive, i.e.,
it depends on the level of detail that we use. Our definition
of production, on the other hand, applies equally to both ver-
sions of the example. It therefore avoids Hall’s relativistic
conclusion.
5.2 Preempted Contributors
Producers are literals whose contribution helped bring about
the effect. The following definition on the other hand gener-
alizes the failure of Billy’s contribution to do so.
Definition 14. Given (M,~u, τ) |= C ∧E, we define C to be
preempted for E if C contributes to E w.r.t. (M,~u) and it is
not a producer of E w.r.t. (M,~u, τ).
The difference between the role of Billy’s throw in SO
compared to LP, can now be expressed by saying that it
changes from being a producer to being preempted. Con-
cretely, any appropriate timing τ for LP will have τ(BA) >
τ(BS), whereas for SO, τ(BA) = τ(SA) ≤ τ(BS). This
allows us to exclude BT from being a cause of BS in LP,
by applying the formal counterpart of the aforementioned
principle.
Principle 3 (Preemption). If C is a cause of E
w.r.t. (M,~u, τ), then C is not preempted for E
w.r.t. (M,~u, τ).
Combining Contributing and Preemption results in a
stronger necessary condition for causation:
Corollary 1 (Producing). If C is a cause of E
w.r.t. (M,~u, τ), then C is a producer of E w.r.t. (M,~u, τ).
Extending the language of structural equations with ex-
plicit timings forms a substantial departure from existing
structural equations approaches. However, one should not
overestimate the role of a timing either. Looking at Principle
3 and Definition 14, we learn that the influence of a timing is
limited to the timing of preempted events. Hence in practice
it suffices to just give a partial timing over the literals that
represent competing processes and their effect, such as BA,
SA and BS in case of LP.
In all of the examples we have seen so far, producers were
always causes. The next section shows that this is not neces-
sarily the case.
6 Switches
Examples involving a switch make up another popular cate-
gory to gauge intuitions on causation. The following exam-
ple is paradigmatic (Hall, 2007)[p. 118]:
Example 5 (Switch). An engineer is standing by a switch in
the railroad tracks. A train approaches in the distance. She
flips the switch, so that the train travels down the left-hand
track, instead of the right. Since the tracks reconverge up
ahead, the train arrives at its destination all the same.
The following is an appropriate model for this story,
where RT (LT ) means that the train goes down the right-
hand (left-hand) track, Dest means that the train arrives at
its destination, and the context is such that Switch holds, i.e.,
the engineer flips the switch.
Dest := LT ∨RT.
LT := Switch.
RT := ¬Switch.
Intuitively most people agree that flipping the switch is
not a cause for the train’s arrival. But obviously it is a cause
of the train going down the left-hand track, and this in turn
is a cause of the train’s arrival. Hence this is a counterex-
ample to the transitivity of causation. Given that production
is, by definition, transitive, it is also a counterexample to the
sufficiency of production.
Part of the reason why we judge there to be no causation
here is that the train would have arrived at its destination ei-
ther way, i.e., there is no dependence. However we already
know that dependence is not necessary for causation, so this
is not the whole story. The further justification for our judg-
ment is that the actual and the counterfactual story are too
symmetrical in regards to the function of the switch. Flip-
ping the switch contributes to a process that results in the
train arriving. Not flipping the switch contributes to a differ-
ent process, but one that has the exact same result. There-
fore Switch and ¬Switch perform the same causal role in
both stories, that of contributing to a process which results
in Dest.
A fundamental property of causation, which underlies
Principle 1 as well, is that causes are difference makers. De-
pendence expresses the strongest form of making a differ-
ence: to make a difference as to whether or not the effect
takes place. What the switch example illustrates is that there
is a weaker form of making a difference that is a necessary
condition for causation, namely that the absence of a cause
fulfills a different role than the cause itself. We formalize
this property by means of the following principle.
Principle 4 (Asymmetry). If C is a cause of
E w.r.t. (M,~u, τ), then ¬C is not a cause of E
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u, τdo(¬C)).
This principle and the importance of difference making is
defended as well by Sartorio (2005). Also Weslake (2015)
incorporates a very similar principle into his definition of
causation. However his formulation falls prey to a coun-
terexample that we will discuss in Section 11.
Given the extreme symmetry between the actual story in
Example 5 and the counterfactual story where the switch is
not flipped, most definitions of causation will either judge
both Switch and ¬Switch to be causes in their respective sto-
ries, or neither. Accepting Principle 4 delivers the intuitive
verdict that neither is a cause. Note though that both Switch
and ¬Switch are producers in their respective stories.
The qualification “most definitions” we made in the pre-
vious paragraph arises from the fact that some authors claim
only events can be causes, and therefore Principle 4 would
be trivially satisfied for them. Recall that contrary to this
view, we assume true and false are to be treated symmet-
rically.
Before we move on, we need to address a possible ob-
jection. Some readers may not share our intuitions on the
Switch example, on grounds that it is not at all certain the
train will arrive either way. For instance, who is to say the
right track would not break down? This is an important
point, which can be made more vividly by using another
famous counterexample to the necessity of dependence, so-
called early preemption. We direct our attention to this ex-
ample, in order to show that we can do justice to these intu-
itions without dropping Asymmetry.
7 Non-determinism
Imagine yet another variant of our story:
Example 6. Suzy throws a rock at a bottle. The rock hits it,
and the bottle breaks. However Billy was watching Suzy, and
would have thrown a rock just in case Suzy did not throw.
This is an example of Early Preemption, because the
causal mechanism connecting Billy’s throw to the bottle
shattering is preempted by Suzy already before the effect
of the bottle shattering occurs. We can re-use the model
from Example 3, except that the equation for BT becomes
BT := ¬ST.
Only ST is directly dependent on the context ~u, which is
such that Suzy throws. Most authors consider examples of
early preemption on a par with late preemption, and hence
judge ST to be a cause of BS in this case as well. Yet if we
compare this example to Switch, then we see that they are
remarkably similar. ST plays exactly the same role here as
Switch does, namely it determines which of two processes
occurs, where each process by itself is sufficient for the ef-
fect to take place.
Everything we just said about Switch, also holds for EP:
in both cases the candidate cause – ST or Switch – is a pro-
ducer of the effect (just as with SO and LP), and in the
counterfactual situation the negation of the candidate cause
is also a producer of the effect (contrary to SO and LP). In
fact, the structural models and assignments to variables are
almost completely identical in both cases.
But then how do we explain the prevalent intuition that ST
is a cause of BS in EP? Here it becomes useful to consider
the possibility that the effect will not occur either way. Ac-
cording to our current model, it is certain that if Suzy does
not throw then the bottle will shatter nonetheless. Surely that
does not sound very realistic, as who is to say that Billy will
not miss? All of our rock-throwing equations so far have
assumed that Suzy or Billy throwing always results in the
bottle’s shattering. This assumption was a harmless simpli-
fication in the previous examples, because in each of them
the actual story contained information on Billy’s accuracy
(with the exception of Example 1, where it was irrelevant).
Because this is no longer the case here (since in the actual
story Billy did not even throw), a proper analysis of EP re-
quires incorporating this uncertainty. Hence we extend our
model with variables SAcc andBAcc, representing Suzy and
Billy’s accuracy when they throw.
BS := SA ∨BA.
SA := ST ∧ SAcc.
BA := BT ∧BAcc.
BT := ¬ST.
Allowing for the throws to be inaccurate changes the ex-
ample significantly. In this paper we have limited ourselves
to deterministic examples, meaning we assumed that for
each variable there was a definite truth-value in the actual
story. The underlying motivation for this limitation is that
as a result there is an unambiguous interpretation of the
counterfactual story (Mdo(¬C), ~u), because that story cor-
responds to precisely one assignment of truth-values to all
variables. To tackle Early Preemption we need to take a little
excursion into the more general realm of non-deterministic
examples, where there might be several counterfactual sto-
ries. Since there is no sense in whichBAcc has a value in the
actual story where Billy does not throw, the value of BAcc
is undetermined. This means we have to consider both the
counterfactual story where Billy’s rock hits the bottle and it
shatters, and that in which he throws and misses.9
Our approach can easily be generalised to allow for non-
deterministic cases, by extending the context ~U with exoge-
nous variables ~W whose values are undetermined in the ac-
tual story (eg., BAcc in EP).
Definition 15. Given a causal model M over endogenous
variables ~V and exogenous variables ~U , we define a partial
context as an assignment ~u′ of values to variables so that
~U ′ ⊆ ~U , and refer to (M, ~u′) as a partial causal setting. We
call an assignment ~w to the remaining exogenous variables
W = U \ U ′ a completion of u′.
Dependence is then defined as follows:
Definition 16. Given a partial causal setting (M, ~u′) such
that for all completions ~w of ~u′ we have: (M, ~u′ ∪ ~w) |=
C ∧ E, E is counterfactually dependent on C if there exists
a completion ~w such that: (Mdo(¬C), ~u′ ∪ ~w) |= ¬E.
All other definitions can be similarly generalised to par-
tial causal settings. As before, actual causation is relative to
a story. Up until now such stories have been represented for-
mally as a causal setting (M,~u). In the current more general
setting, a story takes the form of a partial causal setting ex-
tended with a timing: (M, ~u′, τ).
Our original Principle 4 is then replaced with:
Principle 4 (Asymmetry version 2). If C is a cause of E
w.r.t. (M, ~u′, τ), then there exists a completion ~w of ~u′ so
that¬C is not a cause ofE w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u′∪ ~w, τdo(¬C)).
As a consequence, by adding the appropriate variables al-
lowing for several counterfactual stories, we are able to do
justice to our intuitions in both Switch and EP. If it is real-
istic to assume that train tracks do not malfunction, then the
train will arrive either way and flipping the switch is not a
cause. If on the other hand our intuitions do not support this
assumption, then possibly the train would not arrive but for
flipping the switch, and hence flipping it is a cause.
In the EP example, the counterpart of the malfunctioning
track is Billy missing the bottle. Since it is quite plausible to
take the accuracy of a boy throwing a rock to be much more
uncertain than a sturdy track breaking, it is to be expected
that intuitions for Suzy’s throw being a cause are more com-
mon than those for flipping the switch. Hence an appropri-
ate model for EP should contain a variable representing the
uncertainty of the counterfactual story, contrary to a model
for Switch. The more general non-deterministic version of
Asymmetry then gives the right answer in both cases.
9The value of BAcc being undetermined can either be inter-
preted ontologically, meaning there is no fact of the matter what its
value would have been had Billy thrown, or epistemically, meaning
we simply do not possess any information that establishes the value
of BAcc. Our approach can be applied using either interpretation.
The lesson to be learned here is that structurally there is no
difference between examples labelled “switches” and those
commonly taken to exhibit early preemption. The difference
lies in the reliability of the background process which might
produce the effect in the absence of the actual process. Hav-
ing expounded the importance of non-determinism in these
examples, to keep things simple from here onwards we focus
again on the deterministic version of Asymmetry.
7.1 Comparison to HP
For reasons of simplicity, most structural equations ap-
proaches stick to deterministic models. Still, all of them
claim to provide an adequate analysis of both Early Pre-
emption and Switch. To further justify our use of non-
determinism, we take a closer look at the most influential
account of actual causation, by Halpern and Pearl (2005).
They apply the same reasoning to Switch as we have applied:
Is flipping the switch a legitimate cause of the trains
arrival? Not in ideal situations, where all mechanisms
work as specified. But this is not what causality (and
causal modeling) are all about. Causal models earn
their value in abnormal circumstances, created by struc-
tural contingencies, such as the possibility of a mal-
functioning track. It is this possibility that should enter
our mind whenever we decide to designate each track
as a separate mechanism (i.e., equation) in the model
and, keeping this contingency in mind, it should not be
too odd to name the switch position a cause of the train
arrival (or non-arrival).
Note that they explicitly refer to “the possibility of a
malfunctioning track” as a structural contingency. On the
face of it this suggests that the motivation behind their ap-
proach for dealing with Early Preemption/Switch is very
similar to ours: if it is considered a significant possibility
that the backup mechanism fails, then this possibility should
be taken into account to assess causation. Concretely, in that
case we should take into account the counterfactual story
where the candidate cause does not occur, and the backup
mechanism fails. Which factors determine whether or not
the failure of the backup mechanism – be it a train track or a
person throwing a rock – is a significant possibility is mostly
an empirical matter, and should be decided on a case by case
basis.
We find further confirmation of our interpretation by con-
sidering another example of Early Preemption, discussed by
Halpern and Pearl (2005)[p. 30]. We present here the origi-
nal formulation by McDermott (1995).
Example 7. [Early Preemption 2] Suppose I reach out and
catch a passing cricket ball. The next thing along in the
ball’s direction of motion was a solid brick wall. Beyond
that was a window.
Is catching the ball a cause of the window being safe?
Even without giving a structural model to go along with
this story, the similarity to Early Preemption and Switch is
obvious. Again, the answer depends on whether or not we
consider the possibility that the backup mechanism – the
wall blocking the window – will fail. Intuitively, most peo-
ple judge this example to be more similar to Switch than to
Early Preemption, meaning they do not judge catching the
ball to be a cause. This is consistent with our approach: as
with the failure of train tracks, people generally do not con-
sider it a significant possibility that a solid brick wall will
fail to stop a cricket ball. Halpern and Pearl (2005) also treat
this example similar to Switch:
If we make both the wall and the fielder endogenous
variables, then the fielder’s catch is a cause of the win-
dow being safe, under the assumption that the fielder
not catching the ball and the wall not being there is
considered a reasonable scenario. On the other hand,
if we take it [sic] for granted the wall’s presence (either
by making the wall an exogenous variable, not includ-
ing it in the model, or not allowing situations where
it doesn’t block the ball if the fielder doesn’t catch it),
then the fielder’s catch is not a cause of the window be-
ing safe. It would remain safe no matter what the fielder
did, in any structural contingency.
The difference between their approach and ours lies in the
method used to represent the failure of the backup mech-
anism.10 We choose to do so in a very straightforward
fashion: all possible stories are modelled as some partial
causal setting (M,~u′, τ). Hence we interpret the determinis-
tic model for Early Preemption as stating that it is impos-
sible for Billy to miss when he throws. If this statement
is considered inappropriate, then one should use the non-
deterministic model given above, i.e., one should add a vari-
able that represents Billy’s accuracy and consider the possi-
bility that he misses.
Since Halpern and Pearl restrict themselves to determin-
istic models, the choice between these two models is not
available to them. This explains why they seek recourse in
structural contingencies, as they need some other method
to consider stories beyond the ones allowed by a structural
model.
One could take this to imply that the difference here
is merely a matter of taste, depending on one’s preferred
method to represent uncertainty. This is far from the truth.
Halpern and Pearl use structural contingencies in a wide va-
riety of cases, and these go well beyond examples resem-
bling Early Preemption.
The criteria for deciding if a structural contingency may
be used are rather technical, and are not founded on under-
lying principles or heuristics that guide their application. As
a result, they allow for a plethora of situations for which it
is hard to see why we should consider them at all.11 Indeed,
10This difference is not limited to Halpern and Pearl. Collins
(2000) and Hitchcock (2001) use the same terminology when dis-
cussing which counterfactual scenarios ought to be considered. For
example, confronted with Example 7, Collins (2000)[p. 8] says that
“It is more far-fetched, on the other hand, to suppose that the brick
wall be absent, or that the ball would miraculously pass straight
through it.” Considering an example involving a boulder Hitchcock
(2001)[p. 298] says of the failure of the backup mechanism that
“This possibility is just too far-fetched.” Hall and Paul (2003)[p.
26] criticise Hitchcock by pointing out the arbitrariness in his use
of this terminology.
11For details on these situations and the counterexamples they
Halpern and Pearl (2005)[p.24] concede that in some cases
their definition offers acceptable answers only if one ex-
plicitly stipulates which situations are “allowable settings”.
Therefore the interpretation of structural contingencies we
have just given only applies to a limited number of cases.
To illustrate, we briefly return to Late Preemption. HP use
the following model for this example, where SH and BH
represent Suzy’s, respectively Billy’s, rock hitting the bottle:
BS := SH ∨BH.
SH := ST.
BH := BT ∧ ¬SH.
We first have a look at whether or not this model is appro-
priate to capture the causal structure behind Late Preemp-
tion.
A first problem with this model is that the asymmetry be-
tween Suzy’s throw and that of Billy is built right into the
model: it does not allow for the story in which Billy throws
faster than Suzy, or the story in which they both throw
equally fast, as in Symmetric Overdetermination. There is
nothing in the informal story in Example 3 to suggest that the
difference in speed is a general, structural property. On the
contrary, it sounds natural to assume that this difference is a
contingent property of the actual story. However, as pointed
out by Halpern (2016), this problem can be set straight by
also including BH into the equation for SH , and adding an
exogenous variable to represent the order by which the rocks
arrive. Hence this problem is of little consequence.
A second, more fundamental, problem, is the presence of
SH in the equation forBH . Recall that a structural equation
represents a causal mechanism, in this case the mechanism
connecting Billy’s throw to Billy’s rock hitting the bottle.
That mechanism does not involve SH , since Suzy and her
rock form an entirely different and independent mechanism.
Therefore, it seems conceptually wrong to include SH in the
equation for BH . A consequence of this conceptual error is
that if we consider the context where only Billy throws, then
¬ST is actually a producer (according to our definition) of
BS. This is a very counterintuitive result.
The role played by ¬SH in the equation for BH is not
that of a contributor to BH , but rather that of a constraint:
it is supposed to capture the property that a bottle cannot
shatter if it has already done so. This confirms that one can-
not adequately deal with Late Preemption without making
vital use of temporal information, as we argued in Section
5. Since HP stick to structural equations proper, they are
forced to build this temporal information into the model it-
self. More specifically, the presence of ¬SH in the equation
for BH compensates for the fact that they do not use a tim-
ing. Given these counterintuitive consequences, we prefer to
use our symmetric model, containing the variables SA and
BA.
allow, see for example (Hall, 2007; Weslake, 2015). Halpern (2016)
has recently proposed a new definition which is more restrictive,
avoiding some of these pitfalls, but not all. Further, it allows for
new counterexamples, eg., it fails to judge each of ST and BT a
cause in case of SO.
Here it is useful to point out that for every approach using
structural equations, the verdict given by a definition of cau-
sation is to a large degree dependent on the particular model
being used. Since in many cases there is room for debate as
to which model is appropriate for a given informal story, this
means one can often counteract undesired outcomes of ap-
plying a definition by calling into question the model being
used. (See (Halpern and Hitchcock, 2010) for a discussion of
this issue.) However because our approach ultimately relies
on basic principles, rather than on the intutiveness of exam-
ples, we believe it is less affected by this issue. If one accepts
our principles, then one can make judgments about a causal
model regardless of which informal story it is supposed to
capture. In this manner, the problem of model appropriate-
ness can to some extent be separated from the problem of
defining actual causation.
Setting aside our disagreement regarding the choice of
model for Late Preemption, we now turn to the HP approach
and how it applies given their preferred model. It considers
the structural contingency that Billy throws and yet fails to
hit the bottle, even though Suzy does not throw. Contrary
to the interpretation used for Switch, this structural contin-
gency cannot be interpreted simply as the possibility that
the backup mechanism fails to function properly, because
the actual story explicitly stipulates that it does not: “Billy’s
throw was also accurate, and would have shattered the bottle
had it not been preempted by Suzy’s throw.” This stipulation
is not just a detail occurring in our version of the example,
but forms an essential part of Late Preemption cases.
One might object that there is also another possible inter-
pretation, consistent with what has been said: namely that a
structural contingency represents what is generally possible,
rather than what is possible given the actual story. On this
reading, the actual information that Billy was accurate is of
no interest, all that matters is whether or not in general it is
possible that he is not accurate. But going down this road
leads to a slippery slope, for it blurs the distinction between
general and actual causation. More specifically, if one can
ignore the actual state of Billy’s accuracy, then why not ig-
nore other aspects of the actual story as well? For example,
why not then consider the story in which Suzy throws but
misses and Billy does not throw, and use it to conclude that
Billy’s throw also caused the bottle to shatter in Late Pre-
emption?
Obviously according to the HP definition it is not the case
that anything goes. Only those structural contingencies sat-
isfying certain – somewhat complicated – conditions may be
considered. But what should be clear by now, is that it is not
easy to come up with a consistent and systematic interpreta-
tion of what these structural contingencies are supposed to
represent. Therefore we prefer to stay far away from them,
and instead simply use a non-deterministic model to repre-
sent aspects of the story which are not actually determined,
and use a timing to exclude those events which happened too
late.
8 Dependence Revisited
So far, we have established that dependence is sufficient for
causation but not necessary, while production is necessary
but not sufficient. Therefore causation must lie in between
these two concepts. To pinpoint its location, we present a
theorem that relates dependence to production.12
Theorem 1. Given a valid timing τ , E is dependent on C
w.r.t. (M,~u) if and only if both of the following conditions
hold:
• [Condition 1]: C is a producer of E w.r.t. (M,~u, τ).
• [Condition 2]: ¬C is a producer of ¬E
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u, τdo(¬C)).
Because this theorem indiscriminately applies to all valid
timings, the first conclusion we can draw from it is that all
information contained in a particular timing is lost when
we consider dependence. Since we introduced the notion
of a timing precisely to distinguish between cases where
dependence was too crude a tool, this should not come as
a surprise. On the contrary, the lesson learned from com-
paring examples such as Symmetric Overdetermination and
Late Preemption was that the actual timing should be taken
into account in order to judge actual causation. This theorem
shows that without loss of generality, we can restrict our at-
tention to one particular timing when comparing dependence
and production. We now consider how the conjunction of
Conditions 1 and 2 can be weakened, so that we shift from
dependence to causation.
By Producing, we know Condition 1 should stay. Yet
as the Switch example has shown, production does not sat-
isfy Asymmetry: both Switch and ¬Switch are produc-
ers of Dest in their respective stories. Therefore a straight-
forward and natural suggestion is to combine production
(Condition 1) with the constraint that Asymmetry should
be satisfied. In other words, Condition 2 should be re-
placed with Condition 2’: ¬C is not a producer of E
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u, τdo(¬C)).
Since Switch was the only example discussed which re-
quired us to look beyond production, it is easy to see that
defining causation as the conjunction of Conditions 1 and
2’ agrees with our judgments on all examples discussed so
far. Note however that temporal information plays no role in
judging Switch: the model is such that each story only allows
one valid timing, and hence in this case the notions of pro-
ducing and contributing are equivalent. Therefore we cannot
rule out a slightly stronger alternative to Condition 2, let us
call it Condition 2”, where producing is replaced with con-
tributing: ¬C does not contribute to E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u).
To decide between these two conditions, we now present
an example in favour of adopting Condition 2’, instead of
Condition 2”.
9 Not Contributing vs. Not Producing
In this section we present a counterexample to the neces-
sity of Condition 2”, resulting in the acceptance of Con-
dition 2’. However the example is rather exotic, since it is
hard to even find examples for which these two options dis-
agree. (We have not found any in the literature.) Hence we
do not put much weight on our preference of Condition 2’
over Condition 2”, as in practice this will hardly ever matter.
12A proof of this theorem is given the Appendix.
Example 8. In general, Billy throws rocks at bottles either if
Suzy does not, or if he just feels like it. Today, Billy throws a
rock at a bottle. Immediately afterwards Suzy throws a rock
as well. Suzy’s rock was thrown harder, and gets there first,
shattering the bottle. However Billy’s throw was also accu-
rate, and would have shattered the bottle had it not been for
Suzy.
To model this variant of the rock-throwing story, which
combines elements of early and late preemption, we need to
adjust the equation for BT , giving:
BS := SA ∨BA.
SA := ST ∧ SAcc.
BA := BT ∧BAcc.
BT := Feels ∨ ¬ST.
Here Feels means that Billy just feels like throwing, re-
gardless of what Suzy does. Hence the context is such that
Feels and ST hold. An appropriate timing τ is such that
τ(Feels) ≤ τ(BT ) < τ(ST) ≤ τ(SA) ≤ τ(BS) <
τ(BA). The question is whether or not ST is a cause of BS.
Given that Suzy’s throw preempted Billy’s throw from
shattering the bottle, the example looks similar to LP, which
suggests that ST is a cause. On the other hand, in the coun-
terfactual story do(¬ST), Suzy’s not throwing contributes to
the process that would have Billy’s rock shattering the bottle,
just as with EP. Even more, we know that Billy was accurate,
so there is no counterfactual story in which the bottle does
not shatter, contrary to EP. Therefore the example is also
similar to a switch, which suggests that ST is not a cause.
We believe the first similarity, to LP, to be the more fun-
damental one: even though it may hold in general that ¬ST
can produce BT , in this story we already know that Suzy
threw after Billy did. So in this case, Suzy throwing or not
throwing was completely irrelevant to Billy’s throw, which
was instead produced by the fact that he felt like throwing.
Therefore when considering what would have happened if
Suzy had not thrown, the right answer is that ¬ST would not
have produced anything (except for ¬SA), and just as with
LP ST should be judged a cause of BS.
Now we compare how Condition 2” and 2’ deal with this
example. It is clear that ST produced BS in the actual story.
In the counterfactual story, ¬ST contributes to BS. There-
fore this is a counterexample to the necessity of Condition
2”.
The partial timing τdo(¬ST) has τdo(¬ST)(Feels) ≤
τdo(¬ST)(BT ) < τdo(¬ST)(¬ST). Therefore ¬ST does not
produce BT w.r.t. (Mdo(¬ST), u, τdo(¬ST)), which implies it
does not produce BS either. This is in agreement with the
necessity of Condition 2’. We conclude from this that the
right choice to make is to take the conjunction of Conditions
1 and 2’ as a sufficient and necessary condition for causa-
tion.
10 Discussion and Results
Our principles have led us to propose the following defini-
tion of actual causation.
Definition 17. Given (M,~u, τ) |= C ∧E, we define C to be
an actual cause of E w.r.t. (M,~u, τ) if
C produces E w.r.t. (M,~u, τ) and ¬C does not produce
E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u, τdo(¬C)).
The precise formulation of this definition is dependent on
the fact that we defined production over a partial timing as
being a producer in at least one valid timing that extends it
(as opposed to being a producer in all of them). This boils
down to assuming that the default is for actual contribution
to imply production, which is in line with our earlier ob-
servation regarding the limited influence of a timing: unless
we know that a contributing process was preempted, it is
a producer. As with the difference discussed in the previ-
ous section however, there are very few examples where this
distinction matters.
Our definition of actual causation is built up entirely out
of production, a concept which has so far received too little
attention in the literature. A key property of production is
that it focusses solely on the actual world: unsatisfied literals
are entirely irrelevant. It tells us whether some event brought
forth another as things actually happened.13
Causation shares production’s interest in the actual world,
but extends it with a contrast to a counterfactual world: did
some event bring forth another as things actually happened,
and if so, would the absence of said event not have brought
forth the other? In the overwhelming majority of cases, if the
first question is answered in the affirmative, so is the second;
only examples exhibiting switching behaviour form an ex-
ception. This seems to suggest that the intense focus on the
counterfactual nature of causation that we have observed in
recent years is somewhat misguided. However when we take
into consideration Theorem 1, the picture becomes more
nuanced, since dependence and production are tightly con-
nected as well.
The main distinguishing feature of dependence is that it
cares only about end results: it considers only whether C
and E hold in the actual and counterfactual story, without
looking at the temporal details – i.e., the timings – of how
this came about. The importance of dependence therefore
lies in its simplicity: one can forget about the intricacies of
timing and preemption, and still end up with an answer that
does the job most of the time.
We can express the difference between production, de-
pendence, and causation in a nutshell by saying that pro-
duction answers the “How?” question, dependence answers
the “What if?” question, and causation answers the “Why?”
question. The first is usually associated with understanding,
the second concerns a form of a posteriori prediction, and
the third is fundamental to explanation.
Although we have built up our definition using formal
principles and theoretical examples, there has been empir-
ical validation recently that points in a very similar direc-
tion. The idea that causation is a combination of dependence
and production has been confirmed experimentally on a set
13In this respect it is similar to the notion of responsibility as it
figures in ethics: ethical judgments concern (for the most part at
least) what did happen, not what could have happened. We intend
to examine this similarity in more detail in future work.
of physical test-cases by Gerstenberg et al (2015), although
their notion of production is less formal and somewhat dif-
ferent from ours. They too stress the importance of distin-
guishing between different ways a cause can make a differ-
ence to the effect (Gerstenberg et al, 2015)[p. 1]:
We argue that the core notion that underlies people’s
causal judgments is that of difference-making. How-
ever, there are several ways in which a cause can make
a difference to the effect. It can make a difference to
whether the effect occurred, and it can make a differ-
ence to how the effect occurred.
We now have a look at our definition in practice by con-
fronting it with some troublesome examples.
11 Some Examples
Weslake (2015) gives an overview of the most prominent
definitions of actual causation in the structural equations
framework. After presenting counterexamples to all of them,
he proposes a definition that succeeds in getting the right an-
swer for these examples. We leave it to the reader to verify
that our definition delivers the correct verdict in these cases
as well.14 More interesting are his “non-structural coun-
terexamples”. These exhibit structural patterns that are iden-
tical to cases of symmetric overdetermination and early pre-
emption, yet seem to give rise to different intuitions. He
leaves it as an unsolved problem how to deal with these ex-
amples correctly as well.15 Therefore we consider them as
suitable test-cases for our approach.
The first example, named “Careful Poisoning”, has the
same structure as early preemption (Weslake, 2015)[p. 22].
Example 9. Assistant Bodyguard puts a harmless antidote
in Victim’s coffee (A). Buddy then poisons the coffee (B),
using a poison that is normally lethal, but which is countered
by the antidote. Buddy would not have poisoned the coffee
if Assistant had not administered the antidote first. Victim
drinks the coffee and survives (¬D).
Intuitively, most people – but not all – agree that adding
the antidote is not a cause of Victim’s survival. Rather, it
seems as if Assistant Bodyguard and Buddy are playing a
trick on Victim: “we might suppose that Assistant Body-
guard is up for a promotion ... and wants to make it look as
though he has foiled an assassination attempt. Buddy is help-
ing him.” (Hitchcock, 2007)[p. 520]. The model for this ex-
ample isD := ¬A∧B,B := A, and the context is such that
A holds. It is easy to see that A produces ¬D in the actual
14One should take into account our discussion of early preemp-
tion from Section 7 though: Weslake uses the deterministic model
for EP and still judges there to be causation, whereas we claim
there is causation only when using the non-deterministic model.
15 As a notable exception, Hall’s account (2007) is able to deal
with all of these examples succesfully. (Although he would have
to add an extra variable to the model for the Backup example, and
he disagrees with Weslake on the trumping causation example).
Unfortunately it falls victim to other counterexamples, the most
well-known being those from Hitchcock (2009). Again we leave
it to the reader to verify that our definition does deliver the right
verdict in all of the examples discussed there as well.
story, and that ¬A would likewise produce ¬D in the coun-
terfactual story. This example is thus nothing but a switch,
and hence our definition does not consider A a cause of ¬D.
Looking back at our discussion in Section 7, it is revealing
that Weslake – and others with him – judges this example
to be similar to Early Preemption, but fails to note the sim-
ilarity to Switch. We can accommodate for the observation
that some people have different intuitions here in the same
manner as we did for those examples by pointing out that the
backup process is assumed to be completely reliable, which
might strike some as unrealistic.
The second example, named “Careful Antidote”, is sim-
ilar in structure to Examples 2 and 3 (Weslake, 2015)[p.
20].16
Example 10. Assassin is in possession of a lethal poison,
but has a last-minute change of heart and refrains from
putting it in Victim’s coffee (¬A). Bodyguard puts antidote
in the coffee (B), which would have neutralized the poison.
Victim drinks the coffee and survives (¬D).
As with the previous example, adding the antidote in-
tuitively is not a cause of Victim’s survival. Once more
this spells trouble for many definitions, given the resem-
blance to symmetric overdetermination, where our intuitions
are reversed. We are able to look beyond this resemblance
and handle this example as a case of Late Preemption, in
the same manner as we distinguished between LP and SO,
namely by using the timing. Recall that other approaches
avoid having an explicit timing by adding additional vari-
ables, such as SH and BH in LP. Here, there are no obvi-
ous candidates for such variables, which explains why they
struggle with this example.
Weslake uses the single equation model D := A ∧ ¬B.
While our approach also gives the correct result for this
model, we will explain our reasoning with the following
more detailed one: D := Dr ∧ L represents the fact that
Victim dies if he drinks a lethal coffee, and L := A ∧ ¬B
represents the fact that the coffee is lethal if Assassin poi-
sons it and Bodyguard does not add an antidote. The context
is such that Dr, ¬A and B hold.
As ¬D is dependent on ¬L, it is clear that ¬L causes
¬D. Note also that any causal status of either Assassin or
Bodyguard is mediated entirely through L. Since Assassin
comes first, from the moment he refrains from putting poi-
son in the coffee, it is not lethal. (Or to be precise, the coffee
is no longer potentially lethal, as of course it was not lethal
to start with.) Concretely, τ(¬L) = τ(¬A) < τ(B). Hence
whatever Bodyguard’s action might be, it is too late and is
not a cause of ¬D, in agreement with our intuition.
On the other hand if we change the story so that the order
of Assassin and Bodyguard is reversed, then our definition
would judge B a cause. Indeed, as soon as B happens, i.e.,
16An almost identical example is given by Hall (2007), named
“back-up threat canceller”. He uses it as an example that escapes
his earlier dual-concept view of causation as being either depen-
dence or production, and motivated him to develop his later defini-
tion. As the analysis will show, our more tolerant notion of produc-
tion does capture this example. Thus it serves as a good illustration
of how our notion of production extends his.
the antidote is added, the coffee has become poison-proof,
i.e., no longer potentially lethal. Given that Assassin’s omit-
ting the poison happens afterwards, we see that B must be
the cause of ¬L. Hence it is a cause of ¬D as well.
Lastly, in case we are unable to tell which happened first,
¬A orB, we call both of them causes, just as we did for SO.
To some calling B a cause, even when it happens first,
may initially sound counterintuitive (while others may not
have any clear intuitions here at all). Given the structural
similarities between examples with conflicting, or simply
confusing, intuitions, it is too much to expect of any defi-
nition that it will align perfectly with intuition in all cases.
However an important benefit of our principled account, is
that precisely by pointing out the similarities we can show
how the same principles are at work in intuitively different
examples, and possibly transform people’s initial unreflec-
tive intuitions into informed judgments.
For example, it could be objected that according to our
definition, even if in the end Victim changes his mind, and
does not drink the coffee,B would nonetheless be a cause of
¬D.17 There is no escaping the fact that initially this sounds
counterintuitive. We believe the problem lies with the vague-
ness surrounding the nature of omissions, and their connec-
tion to time.18 In this example, the omission is the statement
“Victim does not die”, or perhaps better, “Victim does not
die from drinking poisonous coffee”. At the start of the ex-
ample Victim’s death had not yet been prevented, and at the
end it has. Hence there must be some particular event that
happened in between such that Victim’s death was prevented
precisely at the moment this event occurred. The question is
which event? Intuitions seem to be at a loss here, as there
is no obvious candidate which presents itself. Certainly re-
fusing to drink a perfectly fine coffee cannot be a cause of
Victim’s failing to die. We suggest that the way out is by us-
ing our principled approach, which generalizes the lessons
learned from other examples about which we do have firm
intuitions. Therefore the first event which prevented victim’s
death should be judged its cause.
We come back to the original story to illustrate the vague-
ness regarding omissions and their timing. The story states
the omission that Assassin does not put the poison in Vic-
tim’s coffee, and that he does not do so because he has a
last-minute change of heart. The fact that the statement re-
garding Bodyguard follows the one regarding Assassin, in-
dicates a temporal order: first, Assassin refrains from putting
in poison, then, Bodyguard adds antidote. But intuitively it
is not at all clear what it means for Assassin’s omission to
occur first, precisely because it is not clear what event oc-
curs (and when it does so) such that Assassin’s mental state
shifts from “intending to put poison in Victim’s coffee” to
“no longer intending to put poison in Victim’s coffee”.
This is confirmed if we adapt the example so that we fo-
17For a very similar example, see “non-existent threats” (Hall,
2007).
18Hitchcock (2007) analyses these types of examples using a de-
fault/deviant distinction As we mentioned in Section 5, the tem-
poral asymmetry between events and omissions in our notion of a
timing can also be interpreted as invoking such a distinction.
cus only on the timings of events, as with Late Preemption
and Symmetric Overdetermination. Imagine that we start out
with a coffee that is already poisonous, and both Assassin
and Bodyguard add an effective antidote. In that case our in-
tuitions would simply follow the temporal order by which
the antidotes were added: if Assassin adds his first, then
Bodyguard adding the antidote is not a cause, and vice versa.
We claim that, by analogy, it makes sense to call Assassin’s
refusal to poison the coffee a cause, as long as he makes up
his mind before the antidote is put in.
12 Conclusion
Our goal in this paper has been to construct a definition of
actual causation from the ground up. We have formulated
several principles which we take to be fundamental prop-
erties of causation, and illustrated each of them by way of
a simple example. As a result we derived a definition that
is a compromise between the pull of two distinct concepts,
namely dependence and production. Given that all three con-
cepts agree on a large number of examples, it is not surpris-
ing that the distinction between them is often neglected or
misunderstood.
We have applied our definition successfully on a num-
ber of paradigmatic examples: symmetric overdetermina-
tion, late/early preemption, switching, careful poisoning,
and careful antidote. In addition, we have also checked our
definition against all examples found in (Hall, 2000, 2004,
2007; Halpern and Pearl, 2005; Halpern, 2016; Hitchcock,
2001, 2007, 2009; Weslake, 2015). Our definition can be ap-
plied to all of them along the same lines as we have applied
it to the examples mentioned.
We hope our principled approach proves useful as well to
those who contest our resulting definition, by clarifying for-
mally how causal judgments depend on accepting or refuting
the underlying principles. Further, we believe the interplay
between the three concepts here described offers a fruitful
perspective for understanding different aspects and interests
present in causal stories. In future work we intend to apply
this insight by comparing the role of causation in different
domains, such as the positive sciences, history, and ethics.
Lastly, our principled definition makes it easier to argue
for or against specific causal judgments regarding complex
examples. Despite the fact that our definition agrees with
intuition in simple paradigmatic cases, we are not forced to
seek recourse in intuitions to justify our answers in all cases.
Given the diversity of intuitions and their mutual inconsis-
tency, it is essential to have a principled method to settle
causal judgments one way or the other.
13 Appendix
Theorem 1. Given a valid timing τ , E is dependent on C
w.r.t. (M,~u) if and only if both of the following conditions
hold:
• [Condition 1]: C is a producer of E w.r.t. (M,~u, τ).
• [Condition 2]: ¬C is a producer of ¬E
w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u, τdo(¬C)).
Proof. The implication from right to left is trivial, hence we
only need to prove the implication from left to right.
Assume E is dependent on C w.r.t. (M,~u), or in other
words, (M,~u) |= C ∧ E and (Mdo(¬C), ~u) |= ¬E.
Take τ to be any valid timing w.r.t. (M,~u), n = τ(E), and
m = min
k∈N
{Lk(M,~u) is sufficient for E}. We first prove that C
is a producer of E w.r.t. (M,~u, τ).
Take L1 ⊆ Lm(M,~u) to be minimally sufficient for E, i.e.,
L1 is sufficient for E, and for any Li ∈ L1, L1 \ {Li} is not
sufficient for E. (Such a set can be constructed by remov-
ing elements from Lm(M,~u) one by one.) By construction, all
literals in L1 are direct actual contributors to E. Moreover,
sincem ≤ n, these literals are direct producers ofE as well.
Since ~U = ~u ⊂ L(Mdo(¬C),~u), it follows that if (L1 \
~U = ~u) ⊆ L(Mdo(¬C),~u), then E ∈ L(Mdo(¬C),~u), i.e.,
(Mdo(¬C), ~u) |= E. Therefore there exists at least one en-
dogenous literal D ∈ L1 such that D 6∈ L(Mdo(¬C),~u). By
the previous paragraph, D is a direct producer of E.
If D = C, then we are finished with this part of the proof.
So assume D 6= C. We can apply the exact same reason-
ing as we did for E, to find a direct producer F of D such
that F 6∈ L(Mdo(¬C),~u). Since production is transitive, F is
a producer of E as well. Given that there are only a finite
number of endogenous literals, and that M is assumed to be
acyclical, continuing this reasoning will eventually end up
with finding C as a producer of E. Therefore we conclude
that C is a producer of E w.r.t. (M,~u, τ).
We can apply the exact same reasoning to prove that also
¬C is a producer of ¬E w.r.t. (Mdo(¬C), ~u, τdo(¬C)), which
concludes the proof.
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